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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Michael Delynn Deuel appeals the denial of his motion to correct his sentence
under Idaho Criminal Rule 35(a).

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
In 2004, Michael Delynn Deuel was charged with felony grand theft (No. 31361
R., pp.19-20 1) and as a persistent violator under Idaho Code section 19-2514 (No. 31361
R., pp.39-40).

The charging document associated with the persistent violator

enhancement―Information, Part II―identified two previous felony convictions as
forming the basis for the enhancement. (No. 31361 R., pp.39-40.) Deuel was convicted
by a jury of both the underlying felony and the enhancement. (No. 31361 R., pp.89-90;
pp.108-11.) He was sentenced to a unified term of twenty years with two years fixed.
(Id.) He timely appealed (No. 31361 R., pp.112-15) and, in an unpublished opinion, the
Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed his sentence. State v. Deuel, Docket No. 31361, 2006
Unpublished Opinion No. 463 (Idaho App., April 24, 2006).
In May of 2007, Deuel filed a motion under Idaho Criminal Rule 35 to correct an
allegedly illegal sentence. (No. 34255 R., pp.11-20.) Along with a number of arguments
not relevant here, Deuel argued that Idaho Code section 19-2514 permits

1

On November 23, 2018, this Court entered an order requiring that “this Record on
Appeal shall be augmented to include the Clerk’s records and Reporter’s Transcripts filed
in prior appeal Nos. 31361-2004 and 34255-2007, State v. Deuel (Ada County No. CRFE-2014-1107).” Following Deuel, the state will refer to records from the prior appeals
as “No. 31361 R.” and “No. 34255 R.”, respectively, and will refer to the Limited Clerk’s
Record in this appeal as “Limited R.”
1

enhancement of the sentence for a persistent violator’s third felony conviction, but not
enhancement of the sentence for any subsequent felony conviction. (No. 34255 R.,
pp.18-19.) He asserted that his “third conviction of a felony was entered in 2004 for the
crime of forgery in #H0300959*, Fourth District, Ada County.” (No. 34255 R., p.19.)
That conviction was one of the two prior felony convictions identified in the Information,
Part II, as providing the basis for the persistent violator enhancement. (No. 31361 R.,
pp.39-40.) The district court denied the motion. (No. 34255 R., pp.21-23.) Deuel timely
appealed. (No. 34255 R., pp.24-27.) Again, the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed,
concluding that “no illegality has been shown.” State v. Deuel, Docket No. 34255, 2007
Unpublished Opinion No. 679 (Idaho App., Nov. 28, 2007).
On March 25, 2018, Deuel filed a second motion under Rule 35 arguing that his
sentence is illegal. (Limited R., pp.10-20.) Deuel again made a variety of arguments,
including that Idaho Code section 19-2514 permits the enhancement of the sentence for a
persistent violator’s third felony conviction, but not the sentence for any subsequent
felony conviction.

(Limited R., pp.12-16.)

The district court denied the motion.

(Limited R., pp.21-24.) The court initially noted that “Defendant had previously filed a
Motion to Correct an Illegal Sentence arguing many of these same issues: On May 3,
2007 the Court denied that motion and on November 28, 2007 the Idaho Court of Appeals
affirmed that denial.” (Limited R., p.22 n.1.) The court then considered the merits of
Deuel’s motion and denied it. As to the application of Idaho Code section 19-2514 to
felony convictions subsequent to a persistent violator’s third, it held that “Idaho Code
section 19-2514 is applicable to a defendant’s third felony conviction and all subsequent
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felony convictions. State v. Bates, 63 Idaho 119, 117 P.2d 281, 281 (1941).” (Limited R.,
p.22.) Deuel timely appealed. (Limited R., pp.25-28.)

3

ISSUE
Deuel states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Deuel’s second Idaho
Criminal Rule 35(a) motion to correct an illegal sentence?
(Appellant’s brief, p.7)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Duel failed to show that the district court erred when it concluded that his
sentence is not illegal on the face of the record?

4

ARGUMENT
The District Court Correctly Denied Deuel’s Motion Under Rule 35(a)
A.

Introduction
Deuel argues that his sentence is illegal because Idaho Code section 19-2514

permits an enhancement of the sentence for a persistent violator’s third felony conviction,
but not for the sentence associated with any subsequent felony conviction. According to
Deuel, the instant conviction was his fourth. (Appellant’s brief, p.10.) His argument fails
for two reasons. First, this Court need not reach the merits of Deuel’s statutory argument.
Even if he were correct regarding the interpretation of Idaho Code section 19-2514, Deuel
has not shown that his sentence is illegal on the face of the record because he points to
nothing in the record establishing that the instant conviction was not his third. In
addition, the argument was raised in a previous Rule 35(a) motion, the denial of which
was affirmed on appeal. Second, he is incorrect regarding the interpretation of Idaho
Code section 19-2514.

B.

Standard Of Review
“This Court freely reviews a district court’s ruling on an I.C.R. 35 motion to

correct an illegal sentence.” State v. McKinney, 153 Idaho 837, 840, 291 P.3d 1036,
1039 (2013). Likewise, it exercises free review over “matters of statutory interpretation.”
Guzman v. Piercy, 155 Idaho 928, 934, 318 P.3d 918, 924 (2014). However, “‘[w]hen
there is controlling precedent on questions of Idaho law the rule of stare decisis dictates
that [this Court] follow it, unless it is manifestly wrong, unless it has proven over time to
be unjust or unwise, or unless overruling it is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious
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principles of law and remedy continued injustice.’” State v. Grant, 154 Idaho 281, 287,
297 P.3d 244, 250 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Greenough v. Farm
Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Idaho, 142 Idaho 589, 592, 130 P.3d 1127, 1130 (2006)).

C.

Even If Deuel Is Correct Regarding The Interpretation Of Idaho Code Section 192514, The District Court Did Not Err In Denying His Rule 35(a) Motion
This Court need not reach Deuel’s statutory argument. Even assuming that Idaho

Code section 19-2514 only permits the enhancement of the sentence for a persistent
violator’s third felony conviction, Deuel’s sentence is not illegal on the face of the record.
He has pointed to nothing in the record showing that the instant felony conviction was not
his third. Indeed, he did not even assert as much below. In addition, he has pressed this
same argument in a prior motion under Rule 35(a) that was denied and the denial of
which was affirmed on appeal.
“[T]he term ‘illegal sentence’ under Rule 35 is narrowly interpreted as a sentence
that is illegal from the face of the record, i.e., does not involve significant questions of
fact or require an evidentiary hearing.” State v. Clements, 148 Idaho 82, 86, 218 P.3d
1143, 1147 (2009). “Rule 35 is a ‘narrow rule.’ Because an illegal sentence may be
corrected at any time, the authority conferred by Rule 35 should be limited to uphold the
finality of judgments.” Id. (quoting State v. Farwell, 144 Idaho 732, 735, 170 P.3d 397,
400 (2007)). “The rule is limited to legal questions surrounding the defendant’s sentence,
and any factual issues must be apparent from the face of the record.” State v. Meier, 159
Idaho 712, 713, 366 P.3d 197, 198 (Ct. App. 2016).
On appeal, to support the view that his sentence was improperly enhanced for a
felony conviction other than his third, Deuel points only to his own assertion in his first

6

Rule 35(a) motion, filed in 2007: “‘In the case at Bar, Defendant’s third conviction of a
felony was entered in 2004 for the crime of forgery in case #H0300959*, Fourth District,
Ada County.’” (Appellant’s brief, p.3 (quoting No. 34255 R., p.19); see also p.10 (“Mr.
Deuel suggested in his initial Rule 35(a) motion that the conviction in the instance case is
his fourth felony conviction.”).) His 2007 Rule 35(a) motion does not support that
assertion by any reference to the record. Deuel’s mere assertion that the instant felony
conviction was not his third does not make that alleged fact apparent from the face of the
record. See State v. Peterson, 148 Idaho 610, 613, 226 P.3d 552, 555 (Ct. App. 2010)
(holding that sentence was not illegal from the face of the record where alleged illegality
was based only on appellant’s “assertion of a fact not shown by the record”).
In addition, Deuel’s Rule 35(a) motion filed in 2007―the only portion of the
record to which he cites to support the view that the instant conviction was not his
third―is not on appeal. This appeal is from the denial of his Rule 35(a) motion filed in
2018. (Limited R., pp.25-28.) In that motion, Deuel does not even bother to claim that
the instant conviction was not his third, much less does he point to any portion of the
record from which that proposition would be apparent. (See generally Limited R., pp.1120.) Neither the district court below nor this Court should be asked to “search the record
to substantiate [Duel’s] claims of error.” See Hull v. Giesler, 163 Idaho 247, 251, 409
P.3d 827, 831 (2018). Indeed, it is difficult to see how the district court could have erred
in denying a motion that did not point to any portion of the record, despite the fact that his
claim for relief under Rule 35(a) hinged on establishing illegality on the face of the
record.
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Both on appeal and below, Deuel has not shown that it is apparent from the face
of the record that the instant conviction was not his third. Even if he is correct as to the
interpretation of Idaho Code section 19-2514, he has therefore not shown that his
sentence is illegal from the face of the record and has not established entitlement to relief
under Rule 35(a).
Further, both Deuel’s 2007 (No. 34255 R., pp.18-19) and 2018 (Limited R.,
pp.12-16) Rule 35(a) motions made the same argument regarding Idaho Code section 192514. As Deuel acknowledges in his briefing, the Idaho Supreme Court “‘has applied res
judicata to the context of successive Rule 35 motions that allege the same underlying
issues.’” (Appellant’s brief, p.9 (quoting State v. Wolfe, 158 Idaho 55, 63, 343 P.3d 497,
505 (2015)). The district court recognized that Deuel’s successive Rule 35(a) motions
alleged the same underlying issues (Limited R., p.22 n.1) and, though it did not deny
Deuel’s motion on that basis, that fact does not preclude this Court from affirming that
denial on the basis of res judicata. See State v. Rhoades, 134 Idaho 862, 863, 11 P.3d
481, 482 (2000) (“[B]ecause consideration of the present motion is barred by the doctrine
of res judicata, we affirm the order of the district judge denying Rhoades’ Rule 35 motion
to correct an illegal sentence, albeit on different grounds than those used by the district
judge.”).

D.

Idaho Code Section 19-2514 Does Not Limit The Persistent Violator
Enhancement To A Defendant’s Third Felony Conviction
Deuel’s argument regarding the interpretation of Idaho Code section 19-2514

amounts to the view that he has violated the law too persistently to be subject to the
persistent violator enhancement. Nearly eighty years ago, in State v. Bates, 63 Idaho 119,
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117 P.2d 281 (1941), the Idaho Supreme Court correctly rejected such a reading of Idaho
Code section 19-2514.
Idaho jurisprudence requires respect for its own precedent. The rule of stare
decisis dictates that controlling precedent be followed “‘unless it is manifestly wrong,
unless it has proven over time to be unjust or unwise, or unless overruling it is necessary
to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and remedy continued injustice.’” State v.
Dana, 137 Idaho 6, 9, 43 P.3d 765, 768 (2002) (quoting Reyes v. Kit Mfg. Co., 131 Idaho
239, 240, 953 P.2d 989, 990 (1998)); see also State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 1001, 842
P.2d 660, 680 (1992) (“[P]rior decisions of this Court should govern unless they are
manifestly wrong or have proven over time to be unjust or unwise.”); State v. Hall, 163
Idaho 744, 799, 419 P.3d 1042, 1097 (2018) (“‘Having previously decided this question,
and being presented with no new basis upon which to consider the issue, [the Court is]
guided by the principle of stare decisis to adhere to the law as expressed in [its] earlier
opinions.’” (quoting State v. Delling, 152 Idaho 122, 131, 267 P.3d 709, 718 (2011)).
In Bates, the appellant made the identical argument that Deuel offers here: that he
could not be subject to the persistent violator enhancement because that enhancement
applies only to the defendant’s third felony conviction and the instant conviction was his
fourth. Bates, 63 Idaho at ___, 117 P.2d at 281. The Court held that the argument was
“without merit” because “[o]bviously the legislature never intended by such statute that
one would be a persistent violator upon the conviction of a third offense but not upon a
fourth for any subsequent one.” Id. Deuel argues that Bates was incorrectly decided.
(Appellant’s brief, pp.9-11.) To overcome stare decisis, he must show that it was not
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only incorrectly decided, but is manifestly wrong. 2 See Sopatyk v. Lemhi Cty., 151 Idaho
809, 819, 264 P.3d 916, 926 (2011).
The Court’s conclusion in Bates is far from manifestly wrong―it is correct.
“‘The objective of statutory interpretation is to derive the intent of the legislative body
that adopted the act.’” State v. Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345, 361, 313 P.3d 1, 17 (2013)
(quoting State v. Schulz, 151 Idaho 863, 866, 264 P.3d 970, 973 (2011)). “[W]hen
interpreting a statute, every effort should be made to give meaning to each word so as not
to render any word superfluous or without meaning.” Barringer v. State, 111 Idaho 794,
803, 727 P.2d 1222, 1231 (1986). “A statute is ambiguous where the language is capable
of more than one reasonable construction.”

City of Sandpoint v. Sandpoint Indep.

Highway Dist., 139 Idaho 65, 69, 72 P.3d 905, 909 (2003).

“Where statutes

are unambiguous, the clearly expressed intent of the legislative body must be given effect,
and there is no occasion for a court to construe the language.” SE/Z Const., L.L.C. v.
Idaho State Univ., 140 Idaho 8, 12-13, 89 P.3d 848, 852-53 (2004). But where the words
of the statute are ambiguous because the statute is capable of more than one reasonable
construction, the Court “‘must construe the statute to mean what the legislature intended
it to mean,’” which it does by examining “‘not only the literal words of the statute, but
also the reasonableness of proposed constructions, the public policy behind the statute,
and its legislative history.’” State v. Taylor, 160 Idaho 381, 385, 373 P.3 699, 703 (2016)

2

Deuel argues only that Bates was incorrectly decided, not that it has “proven over time
to be unjust or unwise,” or that “overruling it is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious
principles of law and remedy continued injustice.” Dana, 137 Idaho at 9, 43 P.3d at 768.
10

(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Doe v. Boy Scouts of Am., 148 Idaho 427,
430, 224 P.3d 494, 497 (2009)).
Idaho Code section 19-2514 reads in its entirety:
Any person convicted for the third time of the commission of a felony,
whether the previous convictions were had within the state of Idaho or
were had outside the state of Idaho, shall be considered a persistent
violator of law, and on such third conviction shall be sentenced to a term
in the custody of the state board of correction which term shall be for not
less than five (5) years and said term may extend to life.
I.C. § 19-2514.

The statute is most naturally read as doing two things.

First, it

establishes a certain status that an offender convicted of three felonies thereby
achieves―he or she becomes a “persistent violator of law.” Second, it associates an
enhanced sentence with that status.
If the instant felony conviction was Deuel’s fourth, as he claims (Appellant’s
brief, p.10), he is a persistent violator of law. Whether he has been convicted of three
felonies or twenty, he has been “convicted for the third time of the commission of a
felony” and therefore “shall be considered a persistent violator of law.” I.C. § 19-2514.
Nevertheless, Deuel argues that the statute “‘only authorized an enhancement on the third
conviction for a felony.’” (Appellant’s brief, p.10 (quoting Limited R., p.13).) That is,
Deuel is committed to the view that though he is a persistent violator of law as defined by
the statute, the enhancement is applicable only on the occasion of his elevation to that
status. Effectively, he reads “on such third conviction” to mean “on [and only on] such
third conviction.”
But this reading of the statute renders its first function―establishing the status,
“persistent violator of law”―completely superfluous. While it so happens that a person
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who has achieved that status will forever after be a “persistent violator of law,” that fact
has no direct consequences with respect to sentencing for any subsequent felony
conviction, be it the persistent violator’s fourth, fifth, or twentieth. 3 The status defined by
the statute is superfluous, on Deuel’s reading. The statute might as well have read, in its
entirety: “a person shall be sentenced from between five years to life for their third felony
conviction.”

This Court “will not construe a statute in a way which makes mere

surplusage of provisions included therein.” Sweitzer v. Dean, 118 Idaho 568, 572, 798
P.2d 27, 31 (1990).
The more natural reading of the statute, the one endorsed in Bates, provides a
purpose for both elements of Idaho Code section 19-2514. The statute first defines a
certain status and then associates a sentencing consequence with it. An individual who
has been three times convicted of a felony is a persistent violator of law and, in virtue of
being a persistent violator of law, that person is subject to an enhanced sentence for any
felony conviction, whether it is his third, fourth, fifth, or twentieth. Of course, that
enhanced sentence will be first available “on such third conviction,” when the status of
persistent violator of law is achieved, but that in no way implies that it is thereafter
unavailable to one who has achieved that status and is convicted of subsequent felonies.
See, e.g., State v. Arthur, 145 Idaho 219, 221, 222-23, 177 P.3d 966, 968, 969-70 (2008)
(affirming denial of motion to withdraw guilty plea to persistent violator enhancement
where enhancement was based on four prior felonies); State v. Skunkcap, 157 Idaho 221,

3

Of course, the sentencing court could consider the defendant’s prior criminal record in
sentencing within the range provided by the underlying conviction, but the fact that the
defendant is a persistent violator of law would not affect the sentencing range itself.
12

226, 335 P.3d 561, 566 (2014) (“The maximum length of incarceration for felony eluding
is five years, but Defendant had admitted to having been previously convicted of at least
two felonies, which made him a persistent violator and extended the maximum penalty to
life.” (emphasis added)); State v. Smith, 116 Idaho 553, 560, 777 P.2d 1226, 1233 (Ct.
App. 1989) (“[T]he judge instructed the jurors that Smith could be found a persistent
violator only if they determined upon the evidence presented that two or more of Smith’s
prior convictions had been felonies. This was a correct statement of the law.” (emphasis
added)); I.C.J.I. 1601 (instructing that defendant can be convicted of enhancement if he
has been convicted on “at least” two prior occasions of felony offenses).
Idaho Code section 19-2514 is most reasonably and naturally interpreted as it has
been for near eighty years, since at least Bates. But to the extent that this Court judges
that it is ambiguous, the reading in Bates is clearly supported by considerations of public
policy. “The purpose of our persistent violator statute is to punish repeat offenders by
making their sentences for successive crimes more harsh.” State v. Brandt, 110 Idaho
341, 344, 715 P.2d 1011, 1014 (Ct. App. 1986). That sensible public policy is not served,
it is undermined, by arbitrarily singling out a persistent violator’s third felony conviction
for more severe punishment, while every successive felony conviction thereafter is
punished less severely.
Next, “‘[i]t is assumed that when the legislature enacts or amends a statute it has
full knowledge of the existing judicial decisions and case law of the state.’” Farmers Nat.
Bank v. Green River Dairy, LLC, 155 Idaho 853, 859, 318 P.3d 622, 628 (2014) (quoting
George W. Watkins Family v. Messenger, 118 Idaho 537, 540, 797 P.2d 1385, 1388
(1990)).

The persistent violator statute was added to Idaho law in 1923, with
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substantially the same language as is currently in Idaho Code section 19-2514. S.L. 1923,
ch. 109, §1, p.139 (codified at Compiled Statutes § 9035A). Bates was decided in 1941,
at which time the statute had been re-codified, but not amended, at Idaho Code section
19-2414. In 1970, now codified at Idaho Code section 19-2514, the statute was amended
for the first and only time, but in a manner not relevant to Deuel’s appeal. S.L. 1970, ch.
143, § 2, p.126. 4 In nearly eighty years, the legislature has never indicated disapproval of
Bates. See State v. Mace, 133 Idaho 903, 907, 994 P.2d 1066, 1070 (Ct. App. 2000) (in
holding that stare decisis required adherence to State v. Brandt, 110 Idaho 341, 715 P.2d
1011 (Ct. App. 1986), noting “that the Idaho legislature has indicated no disapproval of
the Brandt court’s interpretation of I.C. § 19–2514. In the thirteen years since
the Brandt decision, the legislature has not amended the statute to legislatively
overrule Brandt.”).
As discussed above, this Court need not reach the interpretative question raised by
Deuel. But if it does so, stare decisis, the natural reading of the statute, public policy, and
the legislature’s acquiescence to Bates over eighty years compel the result that a
persistent violator of law cannot escape the persistent violator enhancement by violating
the law more persistently.

4

The amendment was as follows:
Any person convicted for the third time of the commission of a felony,
whether the previous convictions were had within the state of Idaho or
were had outside the state of Idaho, shall be considered a persistent
violator of law, and on such third conviction shall be sentenced to
imprisonment in the state penitentiary a term in the custody of the state
board of correction which term shall be for not less than five years and
said imprisonment term may extend to life.

S.L. 1970, ch. 143, § 2, p.126.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that the Court affirm the denial of Deuel’s Rule
35(a) motion.
DATED this 21st day of March, 2019.

/s/ Andrew V. Wake
ANDREW V. WAKE
Deputy Attorney General
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